University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
New Sources of Water for Energy Development
and Growth: Interbasin Transfers: A Short
Course (Summer Conference, June 7-10)

1982

6-8-1982

Constitutional Restraints on Protecting State Interests in Water
Rights
Charles E. Corker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/new-sources-of-water-for-energydevelopment-and-growth-interbasin-transfers
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons,
Biodiversity Commons, Contracts Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Hydrology Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation
Commons, Natural Resource Economics Commons, Natural Resources and Conservation Commons,
Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, Oil, Gas, and
Mineral Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, State and Local Government Law
Commons, Transportation Law Commons, Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management
Commons

Citation Information
Corker, Charles E., "Constitutional Restraints on Protecting State Interests in Water Rights" (1982). New
Sources of Water for Energy Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers: A Short Course (Summer
Conference, June 7-10).
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/new-sources-of-water-for-energy-development-and-growth-interbasintransfers/9

Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment
(formerly the Natural Resources Law Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

Charles E. Corker, Constitutional Restraints on
Protecting State Interests in Water Rights, in NEW
SOURCES OF WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH:
INTERBASIN TRANSFERS (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of
Colo. Sch. of Law 1982).
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON PROTECTING
STATE INTERESTS IN WATER RIGHTS
Charles E. Corker
Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law

New Sources of Water for Energy
Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers
a short course sponsored by the
Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado School of Law
June 7-10, 1982

-

For delivery 9 A.M., June 8, 1982
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON PROTECTING
STATE INTERESTS IN WATER RIGHTS

Charles E. Corker
Professor of Law
University of Washington
School of Law

This paper was prepared for a short course sponsored by the
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
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Can one state in the federal Union
constitutionally forbid the acquisition within
its territory of a water right for diversion and
use in another state? The Supreme Court has
addressed an opinion to that question only once
prior to this year. Justice Holmes wrote in
Hudson County Water Co. V. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
357 (1908), that a state
"finds itself in possession of what all
will admit to be a great public good, and
what it has it may keep and give no one a
reason for its will."
Some have opined that McCarter may be about
to be overruled, possibly in the Sporhase case
which is under submission to the Supreme Court as
I write, or possibly in some other case. My opinion is that the principle Holmes pronounced cannot
be doubted if the principle is understood--as all
judicial opinions should be understood, including
any the Court may write in Sporhase--in the light
of the salient facts of the case in which Holmes
said it.
The first such fact is that the Passaic
River, from which Hudson County Water Company proposed to make a diversion to Staten Island, New
York, is in New Jersey and nowhere is it contiguous
to any point in New York State. The second fact is
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that no act of Congress authorized the out-ofstate diversion. If the water had been accessible to both states, the federal interstate
common law of equitable apportionment would
have applied to give both states some right in
their common resource. Holmes recognized this
in his citations, at 355, to Kansas v. Colorado,
185 U.S. 125, 141, 142; S.C., 206 U.S. 46, 99
(1902, and 1907). And if Congress had authorized the diversion, the result since 1937, at
least, would clearly have been different. The
Act of Congress would be upheld.
This paper revisits an article I contributed
a few years ago to the Idaho Law Review which
reached both of the conclusions I have just restated. Can a State Embargo the Export of Water
by Transbasin Diversions, 12 Ida. L. Rev. 135
(1976). This is a welcome occasion to review the
reasons I so concluded then, and why none of the
recent developments has changed my mind. But to
disclose fully my biases, and to discount them
accordingly, I must tell you that at the moment of
writing (April 30, 1982) I can think of no ground
which might constitute a holding in Sporhase which
would alter that conclusion. That is not because
I entertain any doubt that the Constitution is indeed what the Supreme Court holds that it is. It
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is because I believe it is profoundly important
to the institution of judicial review that all
who read and try to follow Supreme Court decisions recognize that whatever that or any other
court says, unnecessary to its decision, is a
dictum, to be treated with appropriate respect
but not as a constitutional authority more entitled to obedience than, say, an Attorney
General's opinion.
The first widespread attention given the
constitutional issues about appropriations of
out-of-state water across state lines was in
the aftermath of Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963), 376 U.S. 340 (1964). The Court
there decided that Congress not only can authorize the interstate allocation of water among the
states, but it had done so in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), 43
U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976).
That shot reverberated in the Pacific Northwest with plans to meet shortages in the Colorado
River Basin with water from the Columbia Basin.
The Attorney General of Washington was asked
whether an interstate compact, with consent of
Congress, would permit the Pacific Northwest
States to save the Columbia. He said, unequivocally, no. Wash. Ops. Att'y Gen. 63-44 No. 88
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(March 4, 1964). My friend Charles B. Roe,
Jr., wrote the opinion, and it is an opinion
impossible to quarrel with. Witness the fact
that Charlie not only was not fired, but he is
a Senior Assistant Attorney General known in
Washington as "the father of waters."
The authority is the second Wheeling Bridge
case, decided before the Civil War. Wheeling
and Belmont Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421 (1855). The reasoning is incontrovertible. If a compact between two states, with
the consent of Congress, could deprive all future
Congresses of a power to legislate the Constitution itself could be in effect amended by interstate compact, without the required two-thirds
vote of each house and the ratification of threefourths of the states.
In 1964 the question debated today was
answered by an implicit, bedrock assumption in
that opinion. Without an Act of Congress, the
Pacific Northwest states--like all the other
states with which they are on equal footing--are
parens patriae with respect to their natural resources. Why? The short answer, or rather the
words which have been used to label that answer,
is "territorial sovereignty." The label has
tended to go out of use, and some assume that
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General Lee surrendered it to General Grant at
Appomatox Courthouse in 1865 and Grant buried it.
But sovereignty means the power of government.
The ordinary geographic limits to the exercise of
that power between states and between nations
are interstate and international boundaries.
Of course, there are limits to sovereign
power of both state and nation. The purpose of
constitutions is to locate those limits. A state
cannot embargo, it cannot impose unreasonable
limits on export or import of milk. Hood v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Why is water different from all other commodities?
It may be that the Court will continue to
seek an answer to that question, and it may
become persuaded that constitutionally there is
no significant difference. Or it may conceivably
construct intelligible doctrine out of the fact
that milk is marketed by the quart or gallon,
while water is dealt with (but rarely marketed)
by the acre-foot. An acre-foot of milk would be
more than 1,300,000 quarts.
That possibility, however, is unpromising.
The distinction which is much more useful is a
distinction between water, milk, eggs, natural
gas, and chickens on the one hand, and water
rights on the other. At first blush, you might
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suppose that if you have a right to water, you
have a water right, but this is not so. Everybody on earth drinks water, and most drink water
which they have a right to drink. But few
individuals own a water right.
A water right is an incorporeal hereditament related to real property, a right to the
use (or "usufruct") of water as distinguished
from a right to the physical substance of water
itself. You may well tell me that this is
medieval nonsense, which a legislature can and
should abolish because no one understands it and
it makes no sense. I shall be happy to second
any such motion if the mover will come up with
different and better words, but the ideas that
those words represent have been painfully learned
from experience. If, in forgetting the words, we
forget the ideas they represent, we seriously risk
turning back much of the irrigated west to the
desert from which it was reclaimed.
In the beginning, water rights were riparian.
They could be used only on riparian land, contiguous to a water course. But if that is true, and
in fact it is sound doctrine, how did any great
city in a riparian state acquire a water right
for municipal use? The answer is that cities got
water from the same authority that gave them their
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charters--from their states. If the legislature overlooked giving it, prescription based
on the fiction of a lost grant provided security
for the water right after it had been exercised
for the requisite number of years. Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, Fed. Cas. No. 14312
(1827) (Joseph Story on Circuit in Rhode Island).
The concept of state authority which I have
just described is a feature of water law which
has not only survived but flourished under appropriation in the west. In fact, the exercise of
public authority attends the acquisition, the
use, the transfer, and the relinquishment of
water rights. The shorter the supply of water
and the more urgent the demand, the more necessary
is the careful and vigorous enforcement of water
law. The more necessary also is the supervision
and power of the legislature to modify the law of
water rights, of water quality, or water management.
In theory, water law in the west might have
been federal. The United States owns most of the
watersheds, and has always had at least two constitutional bases to regulate and control water
resources. United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). One is the
commerce power, which has had a close relationship

I-8

to navigation and navigable waters since John
Marshall wrote Gibbons v. Ogden, 24 U.S.
(9 Wheat 1) 1 (1824). The other is the federal
ownership of the public lands which is the basis
of a claim under the common law riparian doctrine
by which a right to use water from the contiguous
water course is "part and parcel" of the soil.
Federal land ownership also permits Congress to
grant, to forbid, or to condition rights of way
across federal lands which are necessary to water
use.
However, Congress never moved in the direction of creating a law of federal water rights,
even when it had occasion to do so in the
Reclamation Act of 1902 providing for construction
of great federal irrigation projects. The reasons
may have been partly doctrinal, since the formative
reclamation period was the period of dual federalism in which the Tenth Amendment was often regarded
as a separate and independent limitation on power
of the states. The major reason, however, was
found in the recognition that water rights and
their administration must be carefully tailored to
the diverse needs of each state and widely different conditions within different parts of each
state.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
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Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851),
marks the occasion on which the Supreme Court
adapted commerce clause doctrine to a federal
system. The first Congress in 1789 enacted a
law that all pilots in ports and inland waters
would continue to be regulated under existing
state laws and those that might thereafter be
enacted by the states, until Congress might
otherwise enact. In Cooley the issue was
whether this Act could constitutionally apply
to a Pennsylvania statute enacted in 1803.
The entire Court assumed that incorporating a future state law would unconstitutionally delegate Congress constitutional
power. However, a six-Justice majority
signed the opinion by Justice Benjamin R.
Curtis, which announced a formula saying in
effect that there are two commerce clauses.
If the subject demands a uniform rule,
throughout the United States, only Congress
can legislate to provide it. But where the
subject matter demands diversity, the states
can legislate unless and until Congress does
SO.

There were two minority opinions, either
of which would have put the nation on the
road to disaster had it been followed and become a consistent course of decision. McLean
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and Wayne, JJ, would have held the power of
Congress to regulate pilots to be exclusive
and beyond the power of Pennsylvania. That
course would have resulted in a rigid line
making the commerce power of Congress exclusive
wherever it exists, and never concurrent with
state power. Long before our time the national
agenda for Congress would have become so large
that the nation could not have functioned.
Justice Daniel concurred. He would also
have hewed to a rigid line, but he would have
held that regulating pilots is beyond the states'
power in any and all circumstances. This result
would have left Philadelphia, New York, Boston,
and other port cities astride the highways of
commerce and able to demand, unchecked by
Congress, tribute from that commerce with the
interior.
The Cooley formula continues alive and well.
See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978). It is essential to survival. The only
probable modification through time has been abandonment of the notion that some kinds of commerce
are beyond Congress' power to yield to yield to
state legislation. United States v. Sharpnack, 355
U.S. 286 (1958), reenforced that particular doubt,
holding that Congress can adopt future state laws

on a military enclave to which the state has ceded
its jurisdiction to the United States. However,
the "uniformity" branch is not important to the
subject with which we are concerned. The Constitution commands uniformity for bankruptcy and
naturalization laws, but conspicuously it does
not specify uniformity for commerce.
And the commerce clause is the source of the
only significant reason to discuss constitutionality of state legislation which we are now discussing. Equal protection, due process, and
Article IV privileges and immunities clauses are,
so far as decided cases are concerned, largely
"also ran" arguments.
Three cases--only one of which has been
concluded--constitute the principle of most of
the case law on the question we are discussing.
I shall deal with them not so much for their law
or doctrine. That is diverse. They offer
interesting and provocative examples of difficulty
in deriving adequate doctrine from constitutional
litigation.
These are the cases:
1. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828,
aff'd, 385 U.S. 85 (1966).
Altus, Oklahoma, was faced with a population
increase from 10,000 to more than 23,000 people and
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a water crisis because of the location of a military base nearby. Relying on a 1963 opinion by
the Attorney General of Texas, the city bought a
right from a Mr. and Mrs, C. F. Mock to pump water
from the Mock's Texas farm. Altus had floated a
bond issue and spent a substantial sum when the
local Texas legislator persuaded his colleagues to
enact a law ordering water export stopped without
the Legislature's express approval. Then the
Legislature went home for the rest of a biennium,
and Altus brought suit before a three-judge
federal court in Texas. That court held that the
statute unreasonably burdened commerce. The
Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal by per
curiam order, without citation or opinion.
The result is surely right. One can argue
about its ratio decidendi. I think it rests primarily on reliance, creating estoppel. The Texas
Supreme Court has recently expressed its belief-which is more authoritative than the United States
Supreme Court about Texas law--that the result rests
on continued adherence to the doctrine of Acton v.
Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843),
which insists that the owner of the land surface "owns"
all the water he can pump from beneath his land.
Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Tex. 1978).
Those who want to believe that McCarter is
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wrong, rest on the District Court's analogy between percolating groundwater and natural gas.
Holmes, they point out, dissented in both those
cases. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
533 (1923), West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U.S. 229 (1911). I think the analogy is too
strained to be helpful. Natural gas is trapped in
the earth and does not move, like water. Gas is the
subject of sale in interstate markets, as water is
not. And gas is not renewable; a gas well has no
"safe yield." Most important, there is no "gas
right" with any resemblance to a "water right."
2. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb.
703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981), prob. juris noted, 102
S. Ct. 631 (1981).
If the Nebraska statute challenged in Sporhase
survives unscathed, every other statute is likely
to do so also. On the facts in the Jurisdictional
Statement, the Sporhases are the Davids, defending
against a bureaucratic Goliath the right to pump
water from their own well for use on their own farm.
That right is attacked by the State of Nebraska only
because part of their farm is in Colorado, and
Nebraska's objection appears to be based not on what
will happen to the aquifer or its contents, but on
the fact that Colorado law does not recognize a
right to irrigate the Nebraska portion of a Colorado
farm if positions of the states were reversed.
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Furthermore, Nebraska groundwater law is
a recent and uncertain version of the "reasonable
use" doctrine. Unlike the other cases, Sporhases'
attack includes due process grounds. The Nebraska
Court's opinion is plausible. It says that water
is not a "commodity" in interstate commerce,
pointing to the undeniable fact that what is paid
for is usually not water but service in delivering
water. And, alternatively if that argument is rejected, the burden on commerce is not unreasonable.
Chief Justice Krivosha dissented on Fourteenth
Amendment and state constitutional grounds,
emphasizing the unreasonableness of making the
Sporhases' right depend on Colorado law.
The broadest Supreme Court opinion might say
of the Nebraska embargo-reciprocity statute "unconstitutional," or "unconstitutional on its face,"
or "unconstitutional as applied." An opinion
which stopped with only one of those terms might
well fail to give any clue about the nature of the
constitutional defect, or the freedom of other
states to legislate. And even an illuminating
dictum, confined to the facts of the case, might
not illuminate. We do not know from the Nebraska
Court's opinion whether the Sporhase well in
Nebraska pumps intrastate or interstate water.
04r. John P. Frank, I hope, will tell you about
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that issue in the El Paso v. Reynolds litigation.
El Paso's proposed new wells would be located in
New Mexico, and would pump from two aquifers,
both interstate in a technical sense, but the
water they would reach is mostly intrastate
water which can be pumped only in New Mexico.)

3. Imperial County v. Munoz, 667 F.2d 811
(9th Cir. 1982).
This case involves export of groundwater from
Imperial County by tank truck to Mexico, contrary
to a county ordinance confining delivery to
Imperial County. Whether the quantities are significant or the purpose of its use is unclear.
Earlier litigation involving the Imperial pumper
terminated when the California Supreme Court held
that one accepting a license from the County cannot
attack the constitutionality of the statute under
which it was issued. County of Imperial v.
McDougal, 19 Cal. 3d 505, 564 P.2d 14 (1977), app.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977). In County of
Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54 (1980), litigation
involving the Mexican federal plaintiffs was
remanded to determine if they were strangers to
the state court proceeding.
In 1982 the Court of Appeals of the Ninth
Circuit holds that the prior Supreme Court opinion
offers no barrier to reaching the merits, and on
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the merits, the county ordinance which confined
tank trucks to deliveries within the county is
unconstitutional. The ordinance has been
selectively enforced. 667 F.2d at 812 n. 1. And
the commerce clause does not permit barring
sales of water to Mormons or anyone else. 667
F.2d at 816.
The readiness with which the Court reached
the commerce clause issue should be a source of
concern to those who represent states in defense
of their water laws. However, they may be comforted to be reminded that counties in California
do not administer water rights. Moreover, the
case if it is decided by the Supreme Court on
the merits is likely to be decided on a basis
which leaves interstate and international water
rights law beyond the reach of freely enterprising tank trucks, or any other water-carrying
devices.
International water rights are the subject,
almost exclusively, of agreement by treaty,
just as interstate water rights are the
province principally of control by interstate
compacts. Like most law relating to water
(but see N.M. Laws § 72-1-6 which makes all
sources of water free to travellers and their
animals (if the animals are not too numerous)),
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treaties and compacts do not deal with de minimis
quantities of water such as those which a man or
a horse might drink. However, treaties with both
Mexico and Canada control international water
rights. They would fail to the extent there are
significant alternative methods of diversion
which the silent commerce clause constitutionally
protects.

That concludes all of the cases which bear
directly on the subject. However, a hydroelectricity case decided this year by a unanimous
court should be discussed. New England Power Co.
v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982), is a
decision by Chief Justice Burger. In 1913, New
Hampshire enacted a statute permitting a state
commission to order power companies to cease
exporting hydroelectric energy. The commission
did so in 1980, and the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire upheld the action based on New Hampshire's ownership of the bed of the Connecticut
River, which extends to the Vermont side rather
than to a boundary in midstream. The Power
Companies, which are licensed by the FERC (formerly FPC), secured a unanimous reversal.
Only in one respect relevant to water rights
is the opinion unfortunate. Section 201(b) added
as part of Title II to the Federal Power Act in

1935 says that the 1935 federal statute shall not
"deprive a State or State commission of its
lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted
across a State line." 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1976).
The Court disposes of this as "a standard 'nonpreemption' clause." 102 S. Ct. at 1103. It
does not affect the result because the state has
no such power.
This smacks of the treatment which the Court
has frequently given federal legislation dealing
with navigability and electrical energy. A
classic example is the holding in Arizona v.
California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), that Congress
meant what it said when it insisted that Hoover
Dam was built to aid navigation. Cf. United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725
(1950), where Justice Robert Jackson wrote the
opinion for the Court, holding a like recital in
the Central Valley Project to be "fictitious."
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co. v. FPC, 328 U.S.
152 (1946), the Court read Section 9(b) of the
Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1976)) out
of the statute. The section requires an applicant
to submit "satisfactory evidence" of compliance
with state law and Section 27 (16 U.S.C. § 821
(1976)) is a "non-preemption" provision, both held
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to be meaningless.
One can hypothesize that a Justice not as
conscientiously devoted to the "plain meaning
rule" of statutory construction as Chief Justice
Burger would have rested the decision on the other
ground argued--statutory preemption, not the
silent commerce clause. Statutory preemption puts
responsibility on the responsible agency which can
change the result of a judicial decision much more
directly than does a negative commerce clause
holding. The latter attributes primary responsibility to James Madison, and associates, for a
result which Congress can change if there are sufficient reasons. However, negative commerce
clause cases and preemption cases are otherwise
indistinguishable in their result. Pre-emption
as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Statutory
Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959). Often
both issues are litigated in the same case.
This choice of grounds of decision is important. If the states lose any essential power to
administer their water rights, Congress should by
every means at hand be called on to give the
matter attention. Water rights--particular groundwater rights where the states should be encouraged
to employ the skilled, but expensive management
techniques they have been developing only since
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1927--demand administration by governmental
authority. That means by laws enacted by Congress
if the states constitutionally cannot. Prolonged
delay because of constitutional doubts would risk
permanent damage to the nation's fragile and destructible groundwater aquifers.
The "doctrine" and the rhetoric in New
England Power make it essential that the Court
understand why water rights are unlike rights to
hydroelectric power. This is what the Chief
Justice said:
"Our cases consistently have held that the
Commerce Clause . . . precludes a State from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state
consumers, to natural resources located
within its borders or the products derived
therefrom." Id. at 1100.
These are the cases he cited, prefaced by an
e.g.: Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)
(Oklahoma cannot bar export in quantity of its
natural minnows); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey cannot bar Philadelphia
garbage from its sanitary landfill), and the two
natural gas cases earlier referred to: Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 272 U.S. 553 (1923); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
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The principle stated by the Chief Justice
is one with which no one would quarrel, subject
to two exceptions. His word "consistently" has
more than a touch of hyperbole, applied to
Supreme Court cases on almost any subject, but
particularly on interstate commerce. But far
more important, this qualification is essential:
"Preference to local residents is permitted when demonstrably necessary to the
protection of the resource."
The minnow case (Hughes v. Oklahoma) is
illustrative. There was no reason in the record,
and none is justiciably noticeable, why Oklahoma
wished to bar export of natural minnows, except
one that the Court's opinion said had the flavor
of "post hoc rationalization." Oklahoma apparently dreamed it up for the first time in the
Supreme Court. For some reason, it might be
better for the ecology to return natural minnows
to the stream as bait, and to leave artificial
minnows available for export. In addition, that
is, to the impermissible reason to Oklahoma
minnow growers from competition.
Hughes overruled one venerable precedent,
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), which
held that a state owns its wildlife--feathered,
furry, or finny--and because of "ownership" may
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bar their export. The overruling produced a
vigorous dissent, because Geer had a recent
history of deferential citation, and everybody
should know that state "ownership" is a fiction.
All of us sometimes take a liking to a fiction.
I was particularly fond of this one because I
liked to think of the astonishment of a wild
goose crossing an interstate boundary if he
only knew what had happened to his "title."
The fact is that "ownership" had ceased to be
a useful word for this purpose. The overruling
of Geer v. Connecticut in the long run should
improve the law because it will be easier to
understand. The line between percolating water
in the ground and water in a Coca Cola bottle is
not "title" or "ownership." For purposes of
determining validity of one state's regulation,
the line should relate to the effect and necessity of the regulation.
Thus, Texas lost in Altus v. Carr not
because Texas courts label their groundwater
doctrine "absolute ownership." That is a misnomer.
But Texas lost because Texas' law does nothing to
conserve its groundwater for use in Texas. This
is true, or should be, insofar as "doctrine" of
the commerce clause controlled the outcome.
Finally, this word of cheer. If the Court
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fails to understand all this, it will not in any
event decide the issue beyond the power of
Congress to reverse the answer, just as Congress
did in the Wheeling Bridge case. But it is
quite possible that the Court may be persuaded
that Congress has already made its policy clear.
Five years after Arizona v. California in
1963, the Congress reacted to that decision and
to the awesome power it has. It enacted in 1968
the Colorado River Basin Storage Project Act,
set up the National Water Commission to study
transbasin diversions in general, and declared
that for ten years the Secretary of the Interior
should not even think about diverting water from
the Columbia River to the Colorado Basins. That
date has been extended until it is now 1988.
More significantly, however, it stated the
criteria to be applied if diversions ever take
place. Section 203 of the 1968 Act gives two
protections to "the States and areas of origin"
of the water that might be imported. Water is to
be made available to them when they need it "at
prices to users not adversely affected by the
exportation of water to the Colorado River system." 82 Stat. 887 (1968), 43 U.S.C. § 1513 (a).
Second, basins exporting "shall have a priority
of right in perpetuity to the waters of that

river basin, unless otherwise provided by interstate agreement." Ibid. 43 U.S.C. § 1513(b).
That statute is repealable. But so is every
statute Congress or any state legislature enacts,
except insofar as private and vested property
rights have attached, and then repeal is still
possible. Property rights make only the difference that compensation must be paid for their
taking. U.S. Const., Amend V. Nevertheless that
statute provides a strong statement, until and
unless it is repealed, of a policy of Congress
to protect states and regions in their water
rights until they are given the assurance
Congress provided in 1968.
Can that assurance be provided by El Paso
in the litigation Mr. Frank will describe? I
would suppose not, because El Paso is only a
corporate creature of the State of Texas. Texas
alone can make an effective agreement with the
State of New Mexico. Can it be provided by
Nebraska or by Colorado in Sporhase? Of course
not. Only Nebraska parties are before the court.
Many of the various state laws are oddly
drawn in response I think to some odd case law.
In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the
Court held that Kansas'casewas not ripe. In
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943), it held
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that Kansas had slept on its rights. That sort
of thing tends to destabilize a conscientious
legislative draftsman. There is no doubt that
if all of these so-called embargo laws were to
be literally applied to the full extent of their
apparent terms, many of them would be unconstitutional in many applications. A motorist in New
Mexico cannot, I think, be constitutionally forbidden to fill his radiator from a well and drive
on out of the state. At least not if the well
owner permits.
But no such attempt at enforcement by any
state is at all likely. If litigation results in
broad declarations of unconstitutionality, the result will probably be to make the problem harder
to solve, because they will become impossible to
understand. The basic reality, I think, can be
put in two sentences. I hope that I have persuaded
everybody within sound of my voice that they are
true.
By invoking the negative implications of the
commerce clause the only result which any federal
court can produce is to prevent, in whole or in
part, the administration of the only law of water
rights which now exists in the United States or is
likely soon to be created. A law of water rights,
well administered, is essential to civilization in
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in all of the states which have been created
from the desert.
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Addendum

The direction from Professor David Getches
was to omit footnotes from this paper. That was
a good idea. But it resulted in having citations
to a number of recent Supreme Court cases left
over because they do not fit well in text.
However, they are all interesting cases from which
the Superme Court might find starting points to
construct doctrine should it attempt to take a
different course from that which, I have argued,
physical necessity will compel it to follow.
The only generality which all the recent cases
seem to support, relevant to the subject matter
of this paper, is that the state prevails whenever five or more justices are persuaded that
Congress has either intended to occupy a particular
field or to relinquish it, or the state has an
interest in conservation, environmental protection,
economic policy, or tax revenue which the challenged
state law plausibly serves. And that interest
must be different from mere "protectionism."
Here are the important cases:
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A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976). A ban on milk imports based on the
exporting state's failure to give reciprocity
is not a constitutional health measure.

Baldwin v. Montana Fish andGameGommln,
436 U.S. 371 (1978). State can impose sharply
higher fees on nonresident big game hunters.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.
Ct. 2946 (1981). State can impose steep tax -up to 30 percent of value -- on coal mined in
state.

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265 (1977). State cannot unreasonably limit outof-state interests in offshore fishing.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117 (1978). State can bar refiner-owned
gasoline service stations even though refiners
are all out-of-state.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794 (1976). State can prefer local sellers and
processors of junked autos in subsidized program
to rid state of hulks

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981). Statute requiring 50 percent or
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more of nonrefillable milk containers to be made
of local wood products is constitutional, even
though state Supreme Court was persuaded that
purpose was to aid local industry impermissibly.

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
"Hire Alaska" law is invalid because it does not
bear sufficient relationship to its purpose in
dealing with Alaska unemployment.

Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commln,
432 U.S. 333 (1977). North Carolina law regulating
apple packaging to disadvantage of Washington
apple growers is invalid based on close examination
of purpose and impact of state law and alternatives.

Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S.
27 (1980). Prohibition against out of state
ownership by financial institutions of in-state
investment advisory services is invalid.

Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). Stateowned cement plant, survivor of post World War
agrarian populism, can prefer in-state customers
when cement is short.

Western & S.L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). Retaliatory insurance
tax on out-of-state insurers held valid on basis
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of McCarran-Ferguson Act, relinquishing insurance
to state control after United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass i n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
decided that insurance is commerce.
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